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I. Introduction
The other essays in this volume make clear that the future of taxation depends
importantly on innovations in the gathering and processing of information. As the socalled information economy continues to evolve, systems of taxation, which obviously
require detailed and accurate information in order to function, will have to adapt as well.
In parallel with these innovations in the processing of traditional tax-related information,
there have also been stunning technological developments in the identification of new
information about individual human characteristics that may also have profound
implications for taxation. We are speaking about the human genome and the vast amount
of information that is now or soon will be available merely from a sample of a person’s
genetic material. Recent advances in genetic research have captured the public’s
imagination and promise to revolutionize our approach to treating human disease. 1 The
question we wish to pursue, however, is how such advances in genetic research might
bear on tax policy.
To explore that question, we consider how progress in genetics—specifically, the
proliferation of knowledge about the human genome—may influence the feasibility and
desirability of a tax that is based on individual human endowments, or, to use the
economist’s preferred term, a tax based on ability. The terms “endowment” or “ability”
in this context refer to a measure of an individual taxpayer’s innate lifetime earning
capacity or the taxpayer’s potential wage rate—an approximation of the income that an
individual could generate during her lifetime if she chose to pursue her highest valued
use, as that use is defined by the market. (Below we will explain why “endowment” may
be a more descriptive term for what we have in mind than the term “ability” is; however,
consistent with the literature in this area, we will use the terms largely interchangeably.)
According to tax policy commentators, the benefit of basing tax liability on
individual endowment rather than on, say, income or consumption would be a reduction
in the efficiency cost of raising tax revenue for any given level of distributional
consequences. The efficiency benefit of an endowment tax 2 would be the same as that of
any lump-sum tax: because the endowment tax targets innate characteristics of
individuals and thus would not depend on individual choices, the tax would avoid
labor/leisure—and any other—distortions and hence would avoid the deadweight losses
1

Every few weeks a news story appears reporting that scientists have discovered, or confirmed, the link
between some illness and a particular gene, from Huntington’s disease (which has long been known to be a
hereditary disease) to cancer, heart disease, schizophrenia, and, most recently, diabetes and Alzheimer’s.
For example, see Langreth and Herper (2007) and Wade (2007).
2
Although we generally refer to an endowment “tax”, we mean this to include net transfers, so the reader
should be thinking of a tax-and-transfer system that depends in part on an indicator of genetic endowment.
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associated with income or consumption taxes. In addition, an endowment tax—unlike
some other lump-sum taxes such as a head tax—would allow the tax burden to be
distributed in a manner that many would consider distributively fair. 3 Under an
endowment tax, the greater a person’s innate endowment to command and enjoy
economic resources, the more her tax burden would be. And the less her endowment, the
less her tax burden would be. 4
Everyone agrees, however, that a primary difficulty with an endowment tax—and
a difficulty that many commentators regard as insurmountable—is its impracticality.
How could the taxing authority ever reliably determine an individual’s innate ability to
produce and enjoy income? What sort of test would the government use to determine a
person’s innate lifetime earning potential? 5 This is where genetic technology enters, or
may someday enter, the picture.
The rapid technological progress in the understanding of the human genome may
eventually provide a reliable way to estimate the value of something that approximates an
individual’s endowment—using the person’s genes. That is, insofar as there are human
genetic markers that are statistically correlated with lifetime income or other measures of
well-being, such markers might be used in a tax-and-transfer regime. One form a genetic
endowment tax might take would be as a separate, free-standing tax-and-transfer
program, with the taxes or transfers calculated at birth (if not earlier) and actual
remittances made throughout a person’s life. 6 But other approaches are possible.
Instead, the results of the genetic endowment test could simply be used as an input in the
determination of an individual’s tax liability, for example, as blindness, age and marital
status are used in the current U.S. income tax system. Under such a system, genetic
information would be used as a “tag,” in the language of Akerlof (1978). Akerlof
showed that any immutable characteristic of an individual that is correlated with ability
can improve the equity-efficiency tradeoff of a tax system, because the use of such tags
can produce some degree of redistribution without any efficiency cost (due to the
immutability of the characteristic), thus reducing the need for distortionary redistributive

3

This aspect of an endowment tax is shared by differential head taxes, such as used in the Middle Ages
when there was a fixed tax levy that varied only by one’s station in life: peasant, noble, etc.
4
Because we are applying a welfarist framework in this paper, when we use the term “distributively fair”
or “distributional equity” we mean a distribution of resources that is consistent with maximizeing overall
social welfare. As we explain more fully below, the welfarist case for redistributive transfers generally
assumes the diminishing marginal utility of income for all individuals and, more generally, that individuals’
utility functions are homogeneous.
5
For example, one might consider how to implement an ability tax based on an aptitude test as a rough
measure of a child’s innate intelligence. One problem with such a test is the difficulty of selecting an
appropriate testing age, when the child would be old enough to produce meaningful predictions of their
income-earning ability but young enough to be immune to their parents’ possible efforts at manipulation of
the system (such as by urging the child, unlike with other tests, to pick the “wrong” answers.) Basing the
tax on a test like the SAT would exacerbate the manipulability problem and raises the issue that one’s
potential score depends on human capital investment decisions previously made by parents and child, and
for that reason is not immutable.
6
Compare this to the proposal made in Ackerman and Alstott (1999) to grant a fixed sum of $80,000 to all
people when they reach the age of 21 and who have also finished their high school studies.
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tax instruments (which are not based on immutable characteristics) such as the graduated
income tax. 7
So why do we not already have a genetic endowment tax? For one thing, we do
not presently have a test for overall genetic endowment. Despite all of the recent
advances in genetic testing, scientists have yet to isolate a particular gene or combination
of genes that measures an individual’s innate capacity to produce income or well-being.
There is, of course, a sense in which the existence of such a gene or combination of genes
is problematic, even as a conceptual matter. The correlation of a particular gene (which
is innate) with life-time income or lifetime well-being will depend on a number of
contingent, external factors. Thus, whether a specific gene or combination of genes will
lead to higher life-time well-being will depend on how the economy in which the person
lives values the particular attribute associated with the gene. For example, whether a
gene for mathematical proficiency, if there is such a thing, would correlate with a
relatively high lifetime income will depend upon the value placed on such a skill by the
economy in which that individual happens to live.
Notwithstanding that qualification, we can still imagine science some day
progressing to a point at which it is possible to identify significant and stable statistical
correlations between a given genetic profile and lifetime earnings or even overall wellbeing. At least, such a development is not beyond our imagination. Indeed, according to
some reports, researchers have in fact uncovered evidence of a gene that appears at least
to influence some aspects of intelligence 8 and have certainly identified genes that affect
one’s propensity to acquire debilitating diseases, both of which would seem to be
characteristics that would be importantly relevant to measuring lifetime well-being in any
likely future economy. Thus, in the spirit of exploration and speculation that inspired this
conference on the future of taxation and technology, our paper will explore how genetic
information might be used in some future tax-and-transfer regime.
Not every conclusion or speculation in this paper, however, is pure science
fiction. Some of the existing genetic research that identifies links between particular
genes or collections of genes and numerous debilitating and sometimes deadly diseases
could also be used as part of an endowment tax regime. Insofar as poor health suggests
lower overall well-being, an endowment tax regime based on health-related genes could
be social welfare enhancing. 9 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that there is a
strong correlation between health and income. In this paper we sketch out how such a
genetic endowment tax might be designed.
Even if a genetic endowment tax were to become a practical possibility, there
would still be critics of such a policy. For some of those critics, the taxation of human
potential—as opposed to taxing the realization of that potential as, say, income—is per se
wrong, because such a tax would in some sense force individuals to work who prefer not
7

On this see Kaplow and Shavell (1994b) and Sanchirico (2001).
See Tang et al (1999), Burdick et al (2006), and Nesser et al (1999).
9
This requires that, other things equal, the social marginal utility of resources increases with declining
health status.
8
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to work. This is sometimes called the problem of “talent slavery” or “wage slavery.” 10
For other commentators the case for adopting an endowment tax is problematic because,
depending on one’s assumptions about taxpayer utility functions, it is not clear that an
endowment tax will increase overall social welfare. 11 Although we do believe (and argue
below) that some (though not all) of these criticisms of endowment taxation have been
overstated, we do not in this essay attempt to offer a systematic defense of an endowment
tax. Indeed, we do not argue for or against any particular change in policy. Rather, the
point of the essay is to describe what a particular type of endowment tax – what we call a
genetic endowment tax – might look like in some not-too-distant future world and to
begin an examination of its advantages and disadvantages. Thus, this paper is meant not
to advance any particular policy change, but to kindle the imagination.
In that spirit, we highlight one rationale for the adoption of an endowment tax that
has not been discussed in the economic or philosophical literatures on the subject. Even
if one agrees with the fundamental criticisms of the genetic endowment tax, once the
relevant genetic tests become available, government policymakers will inevitably face the
question of how to respond. This is because, even if the government does nothing, even
if no genetic endowment tax regime is adopted, private employers (in deciding whom to
hire and on what terms) and private insurance markets (in deciding whom to insure and
on what terms) can be expected, in the absence of an effective legal prohibition, to
incorporate such genetic tests into their hiring and underwriting practices. Such market
responses would tend to exacerbate existing inequalities of well-being that flow from
genetic differences.
As we explain below, the government might anticipate or react to these various
developments in a number of different ways. One possibility, to which much legal
scholarship has attended, 12 would be a regulatory response; specifically, the government
could adopt laws limiting the use of genetic information by insurers and employers. In
fact, such genetic anti-discrimination rules have been adopted in many states in the U.S. 13
Also, federal law restricts the use of genetic information in certain situations by insurers
seeking to exclude pre-existing conditions. 14 In addition, President Clinton in 2000
issued an executive order (Executive Order 13145) prohibiting federal agencies from
obtaining genetic information about their employees or job applicants and from using
genetic information in hiring and promotion decisions. Such rules, we argue, can be
understood as a form of indirect (somewhat hidden) genetic endowment tax-and-transfer
10

See Rakowski (2000), Rawls (2001), Murphy and Nagel (2002), Zelenak (2006), and Hasen (2007).
See Shaviro (2000).
12
See Rothenberg (1995), Reilly (1997), and Diver and Cohen (2001).
13
For example, forty-seven states currently have laws that restrict the use of genetic information by health
insurance companies. Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Washington appear to be the only exceptions). See the
National Human Genome Research Institute Policy (NGRIP) and Legislation Database at
http://www.genome.gov/PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm. See also National Conference of State
Legislatures tables on health insurance (at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm).
14
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), enacted in 1996, prohibits health
insurance companies, under certain circumstances, from excluding individuals from group health coverage
on the basis of pre-existing conditions. The law specifically states that genetic information alone cannot
constitute a pre-existing condition.
11
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regime. Alternatively, the government could allow insurers and employers to use genetic
information to sort employees (that is, eliminate the existing genetic antidiscrimination
laws) and could then implement a direct system of endowment taxation and transfer
based on genetic information.
If, however, the government were to choose a third path—to allow genetic
discrimination by repealing any existing genetic antidiscrimination laws without adopting
an explicit genetic endowment tax-and-transfer regime as a replacement—we explain
how the market itself might respond yet again, perhaps in the form of what we call
“endowment insurance,” which would be, in effect, a market-provided form of
endowment taxation.
Whichever of these paths is taken, our general conclusion is that the increasing
availability of genetic information to tax administrators, and the use of genetic
information by private employers and insurers, will affect the optimal design of a taxand-transfer regime. 15
II. A Selective Review of the Endowment Tax Literature
A. From Optimal Income Taxes to Endowment Taxes to Tagging
Tax theorists have long struggled with the problem of designing a tax regime that
balances the competing concerns of allocative efficiency and distributional equity. It is
well known that, assuming the conditions of a competitive market, the only truly efficient
tax–one that does not distort decisions–is a lump-sum tax, which means a tax that does
not vary based on individual choices or behavior. The most straightforward lump-sum
tax, the uniform lump-sum tax (or head tax) under which everyone pays the same
amount, is universally considered distributively unacceptable. This conclusion can be
based on any of several normative theories. For example, under a simple utilitarian
approach that assumes that all individuals in society have identical cardinal utility
functions that reflect a diminishing marginal utility of money, some degree of
redistribution from the rich to the poor would be social-welfare maximizing. Indeed, if
we ignore the incentive effects of such transfers, a simple utilitarian framework would
suggest a policy of full equalization of wealth. 16 Of course, once we allow for the fact
that taxes and transfers do affect incentives, including labor-market incentives, it
becomes clear that redistributive transfers come at a cost that must be taken into account.
That is precisely what the optimal tax literature does. It develops models of
optimal–i.e., social-welfare maximizing–tax regimes that take into account both the
social welfare benefits (due to redistribution) and welfare costs (due to distorting
15

One important issue raised by the use of genetic information that we do not address in this paper is the
concern about privacy. Some may object to any use, by private parties or by the government, of another
individual’s genetic information on the ground that such information may end up being passed on to parties
who are not supposed to have it, or might be used in ways that are initially unintended. This is a serious
issue deserving of extended discussion, but we do not address it here.
16
This was first pointed out by Edgeworth (1897).
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behavior away from taxed activities) of those regimes. Critically, almost all of this
literature works from the assumption that an individual’s endowment, or innate earning
potential, cannot be directly observed by the taxing authority. Thus, Mirrlees’ path
breaking 1971 article and nearly all that followed it focused on the design of an optimal
income tax, on the theory that income, which is the product of unobservable endowment
and unobservable effort, is in fact observable. Scholars working in the optimal tax field,
including Mirrlees, however, have long acknowledged that if earning potential could
somehow be observed, then any redistributive tax regime could in theory be made more
efficient by switching to a system of taxes and transfers based directly on ability. 17 The
intuition behind this conclusion is simple: for any tax regime that redistributes on the
basis of income (or on the basis of any other observable characteristic, such as wealth or
consumption, that is the product of endowment and individual choices such as labor
effort), there would be an alternative endowment-tax regime that could achieve the same
level of redistribution at lower cost in terms of distorted choices.
The appeal of an endowment tax, therefore, is that in theory such a tax can be
calculated on the basis of an individual’s earning potential irrespective of her choices or
effort, thus eliminating any distortion in the choices between work and leisure or any
other choice whose terms are distorted by, say, an income or consumption tax. Similarly,
the endowment tax appeals to some liberal egalitarian philosophers who argue that
inequality attributable to “brute luck” – of which differences in innate earning power
would be an example – is morally arbitrary and (putting aside the wage slavery problem
for the moment) ought to be eliminated through redistributive policy, whereas inequality
attributable to informed choices are “deserved” and hence not appropriate targets for
redistributive transfers. 18
In this essay, we consider a relatively modest application of the endowment tax
idea based on Akerlof’s (1978) observation that, even in a system of distortionary taxes,
if the tax policymaker can identify “tags”—observable characteristics of individuals that
correlate with ability and that are not a matter of choice—those tags can be used to lower
the welfare cost of any distortionary tax regime. The particular context in which Akerlof
wrote was the debate over how to do deal with the problem of poverty; specifically,
whether to use a negative income tax by itself or whether instead to supplement a
negative income tax with adjustments or transfers based on various tags such as age,
blindness, or disabled status. What Akerlof showed was that the use of such tags can
indeed lower the cost of redistribution. Thus, any extent of redistribution accomplished
through tagging rather than differentials in income tax rates produces less overall
distortion of choices, such as labor supply decisions.
A tax system that includes tags, however, is only as good as the tags that are
chosen. A useful tag has three qualities. It must be observable by the taxing authority; it
must be immutable; and it must be correlated with attainable well-being. The absence of
any one of these factors undermines its usefulness as a tag. This is not to say, of course,
that all three of these factors must be perfect. The tag, if not directly observable, must at
17
18

An early treatment in the economics literature is Allingham (1975).
See Dworkin (1981).
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least be something that can be estimated with minimal error. There will always be the
problem of individuals attempting to falsify their tag status—people pretending to be
disabled, for example—and such fraud obviously inhibits the social gains available from
the use of tags. (Of course, such fraud is a problem with any tax base, including income
or wealth; and there is little reason a priori to expect the problem to be more pronounced
with tags.) In addition, a tag need not be totally immutable (even blindness can be selfinduced), but it must be relatively so – relative, again, to the other options, such as
income. And finally, the correlation between the tag and attainable well-being also need
not be perfect. Just good enough. Overall, the observability, immutability, and attainable
well-being correlation need only be good enough that the social welfare gains from
transferring on the basis of the tag exceed the welfare losses. 19 Besides the tags
mentioned by Akerlof—age, blindness, and disability status—commentators have
considered height (Mankiw and Weinzierl 2007) or even race (Logue 2004).
Note that a useful tag need only be correlated with the unobservable ability to
produce and enjoy well-being, and it need not explicitly measure overall ability or even a
component of it. If ice cream consumption were correlated with income-earning ability,
allowing tax liability to depend on ice cream consumption would reduce the inefficiency
for any given amount of redistribution, even though no one would argue that it measures
ability or a component of it. Thus, although we will argue below that genes may measure
expected ability to earn (and enjoy) income, the tagging argument does not rest on the
fact that genes actually measure ability, but only on the fact that the genetic index is
correlated with ability. 20
B. Criticisms of Endowment Taxation (and Responses)
Some commentators in the legal and philosophical literatures object on principle
to an endowment tax. The idea seems to be that, under an endowment tax, high-ability
people whose tastes tend to leisure rather than goods would be “forced” to work to pay
their tax bills; whereas, under an income tax, in contrast, a high-ability person can choose
not to work and thus avoid paying any tax if she so decides. Since every tax produces
some form of this income effect, however, it is not clear why the particular income effect
associated with an endowment tax would be especially problematic. That is, whenever
an income or consumption tax is adopted (or the rates of an existing income or
consumption tax are raised), it can be argued that people are “forced” to work more than
before the change to the extent they want to maintain a given level of consumption. 21
Yet we do not generally hear “wage-slavery” or “talent-slavery” complaints in
connection with those changes. 22
19

Stern (1982) formalizes the choice between a distortionary tax based on an easily observable indicator of
ability such as income and a tax based on an immutable tag that is, however, observed with error.
20
A gene-based tag seems less susceptible to the criticism made by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2007) that such
a tax is intuitively unappealing because it is not targeting the “true” source of inequality, as would be true
of height as a tag in a modern economy in which the non-tall are the object of discrimination but not in an
economy based on “tall fruit-bearing trees.”
21
Others have made this basic point. See Kaplow (1994a), Shaviro (2000), and Stark (2005).
22
In addition, the argument that an individual can avoid paying income tax simply by deciding not to work
at all, or can avoid paying consumption tax by not consuming, is misguided. Everyone has to produce
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A more subtle, and potentially more serious, critique of the endowment tax comes
from within the utilitarian framework itself. This critique raises the following question:
can we be sure that an endowment tax will increase overall social welfare if we relax the
traditional assumption (sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit in economic models of
the endowment tax) that taxpayers have identical utility functions with respect to work
and leisure? Thus, when tax policy commentators applying a utilitarian framework argue
in favor of some degree of redistributive transfer from the better off to the less well off,
they often adopt the assumption that all individuals have identical utility functions, at
least with respect to goods (income) versus leisure, and they assume (as is standard) that
those utility functions are concave. The result is that overall utility is maximized when
income (or, under an endowment tax, potential income) is redistributed from rich to poor,
until the marginal utility of income is equalized across the population. But the analysis
becomes much more complicated and the result less certain when we relax those
assumptions. If, for example, some otherwise identical individuals experience unusually
high disutility (or unusually high utility) from working, it is less clear that overall welfare
could be improved by a regime of endowment taxation. 23 That is, if we do not know
that high-income people value the next dollar earned at least somewhat less than lowincome people, the case for redistribution – at least under a utilitarian framework – is
thrown into doubt. Of course, a similar objection can be raised against the redistributive
effects of a progressive income or consumption tax. This objection therefore seems more
appropriately directed at the idea of redistribution more generally.
Although many of the recent discussions of an endowment tax have focused on
extreme versions of the tax (such as replacing the income tax with an endowment tax),
which presumably helps to explain the preoccupation with wage slavery, we focus in this
paper instead on a more modest use of the endowment tax. Specifically, we consider the
use of tags to increase the efficiency of an existing redistributive tax regime, such as a
progressive income tax. Of course, even the use of this type of tag can be criticized. One
objection that is sometimes raised is that, even if the tag satisfies the three criteria
some income and engage in some consumption to survive; and when they do, the income or consumption
tax will be there to get them, just as the endowment tax would be. And it is not a response to this
observation to argue that an individual with a very small amount of income or with very low levels of
consumption might be exempted from an income tax or consumption tax (either through personal
exemptions or exemptions for expenditures on necessities, respectively). Such an exemption could just as
easily be adopted as part of an endowment tax regime. Likewise, it seems nonresponsive to argue that
under an income or consumption tax, but not under an endowment tax, an individual can avoid taxation by
not engaging in market transactions and by instead limiting her consumption to self-provided goods and
services. This distinction too, however, depends on what amounts to an exemption in the existing models
of real world income and consumption taxes for imputed income. A similar exemption could be made a
part of an endowment tax, with all of the associated benefits and costs of such a policy. Alternatively, as
Kaplow (1994) has suggested, an endowment tax that is capped at some percentage of an individual’s
actual income would achieve some of the efficiency benefits of the endowment tax while eliminating
entirely the concerns of forced labor. Of course, how much of the efficiency benefits of the endowment
tax would be achieved would depend on the percentage used for the cap and on the difference between
individuals’ potential income and their actual income. See Zelenak (2006).
23
This observation about endowment taxation has been made before, e.g. in Shaviro (2000). It is especially
problematic if the high-ability people on average have relatively high preferences for goods versus leisure.
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discussed above—observability, immutability, and correlation with attainable utility—
redistribution with respect to that tag can be stigmatizing. For example, Mankiw and
Weinzierl (2007) suggest that, although height reliably correlates with lifetime earnings
(and, of course, is observable and largely—although not completely—immutable), the
use of height as a tag should be avoided because it suggests that the tall are in some sense
more “able” than the short when, in fact, a more likely explanation for the correlation
with lifetime earnings is employment discrimination against the non-tall. However, even
if discrimination is the cause, it is not clear why that conclusion would cut against modest
redistribution from tall to short. It does suggest, however, that the term “ability” may be
misleading, in that the term suggests different levels of innate talent or skill rather than,
more generically (and less normatively), different levels of potential expected lifetime
earnings. What this discussion suggests is that, in policy and academic discussions of
endowment taxation and tagging, care should be taken to use the term “ability” only
where it is clearly appropriate.
Perhaps the most serious objection to introducing a system of tags into a tax-andtransfer regime is the worry that the three factors described above are not satisfied. And
this is a serious objection indeed. The remainder of this paper addresses the possibility of
a future world in which tax policymakers, as well as private actors, are able, through
genetic technology, to identify genetic markers that meet these criteria.
III. The Genetic Endowment Ta(x/g)
A. The Potential-Earnings and Potential-Health Indices
Imagine that a series of genetic tests are invented that enable scientists, with the
help of statisticians and economists, to develop a reliable estimate of the statistical
correlation between an individual’s genes and her prospects for lifetime earnings. Based
on these genetic tests policymakers can produce an “endowment index” reflecting the
overall potential expected value of an individual’s innate endowment to produce income.
To what extent that potential is translated into income will depend on many factors,
including the individual’s tastes for leisure versus market consumption and immediate
versus postponed consumption.
To further refine the analysis, imagine that the overall genetic endowment index
might be broken into two separate but related indices for every individual. The first
index corresponds to an individual’s lifetime earning potential, which we assume to be an
approximation of the individual’s ability to produce income over her lifetime. The
second index relates to the individual’s lifetime potential health status. A less favorable
health status reduces attainable utility for a given income and, we assume, increases their
social marginal utility of income. As we explain below, both indices could be further
broken down into sub-indices. In addition, the potential-earnings and health-status
indices can be combined to determine a single genetic index that is assumed to be (again,
as a result of scientific progress) completely observable, utterly immutable (putting aside
the possibility of genetic engineering), and closely correlated with potential utility.
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Now consider how the potential-earnings index might further be broken down
into sub-indices that would correspond to the components of innate earning potential.
For example, imagine the day when there is a genetic marker, ascertainable at birth or
earlier, for an individual’s ability to do complex reasoning and mathematics, skills that
may correspond with higher lifetime earning power. Likewise, there may some day be
genetic markers for the ability to work well with other people, the ability to inspire
loyalty among one’s co-workers, the ability to persevere in the face of adversity, and
even the ability to discern profitable opportunities from unprofitable ones or to
distinguish trustworthy partners from scoundrels. And let us assume that all of these
abilities turn out to be positively correlated with lifetime earnings. In addition, there may
someday be genetic markers (such as, apparently, the gene for height) that correlate
strongly with potential earnings, but that are not representative of differences in ability.
Rather, the differences may be attributable to discrimination or something else that
remains undiscovered.
Each of these genetic sub-markers for potential earnings could then be used to
produce a sub-index for each characteristic that, for the sake of argument, we presume is
normalized around some societal average with respect to that characteristic. Thus, an
individual might have a positive, zero, or negative sub-index for mathematical ability,
perseverance, height, and so on, depending on which genetic markers she has. All of
these sub-indices could then be combined to arrive at a single potential-earnings index.
The potential-health-status index would be similar in conception. Suppose that
genetic research progresses to the point that scientists can identify the particular genes
that are linked to substantially increased risk of certain serious diseases, conditions, or
disabilities that tend to produce some combination of (a) loss of earning power, (b)
unusually high medical bills (higher than some average level of medical expense), (c) and
substantial reductions in the individual’s quality of life (in terms of pain, general misery,
and loss of ability to enjoy previously-enjoyed activities). This index too could be
defined with reference to some average level of lifetime health, which in turn would be
based on some average level of risk of contracting various diseases. 24
One function of such an index in a genetic endowment tax-and-transfer regime
would be to enable further refinement of the estimate of an individual’s lifetime potential
earnings. After all, it is easier for a healthy person to find and keep a job than an
unhealthy person. In addition, individuals with below-average health, even if their
employment prospects are unaffected, may need additional resources in the form of
medical care merely to restore them to some average baseline level of wellness or wellbeing. (This fact, of course, is the point of health insurance: to shift resources from the
healthy to the unhealthy state of the world.) For these reasons, just as lawmakers might
24

As with the potential-earnings index, the potential-health index could be further broken down into subindices by disease or condition. Thus, an individual could have a positive, zero, or negative index for, say,
cancer (or lung cancer or a particular type of lung cancer, etc.) based on whether her likelihood of
contracting cancer during her lifetime was less than, equal to, or greater than some baseline level of risk.
Separate sub-indices for every major disease could be developed, which could then be combined to produce
a single health index.
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reasonably decide that social welfare would be increased by making transfers from
individuals with high potential earnings to those with low potential earnings, they might
reach a similar conclusion about transfers from those with better genetic potential for
good health to those with a worse genetic health.
These two indices might then be summed to produce one endowment index,
which might then be used in an endowment tax regime to achieve some level of nondistortionary redistribution. Transfers could be made from those with a positive
endowment index to those with a negative endowment index. Furthermore, we might
assign graduated rates to both the health-related and potential-earnings related taxes and
transfers, depending on how far above or below the baseline the particular index falls,
such that those with, for example, a higher level of potential earnings would pay a higher
percentage of those earnings in tax. Alternatively, going back to the tags analysis from
above, one might use the endowment indices as adjustments to the already existing
income tax system. This adjustment could be in the form of a deduction or a credit,
possibly refundable as with the EITC. Again, the advantage of either approach—the
free-standing endowment tax-and-transfer regime or the endowment adjustment to the
existing tax regime–is that it would allow us to achieve a given distributional target while
reducing the level of progressivity in the existing income tax system, thus reducing
overall tax-induced distortions in the system. 25
If for some reason policymakers preferred to have a redistributive regime that
took into account only some of the various factors that affect lifetime potential earnings
or lifetime health status, they could leave out some of the various sub-indices discussed
above. The endowment index could be designed to include or exclude whatever
combination of the various sub-indices the policymakers thought was appropriate. Thus,
if policymakers decided that differences in lifetime earnings associated with differences
in height or hair color or facial features should not be reduced by redistributive transfers,
they could leave those factors out of the index. The point of collapsing, or building, all of
the various genetic differences into a single index is not to suggest that all genetically
affected differences in earnings or health potential are the same. Obviously they are not.
Rather the point is that insofar as a transfer of cash is to be used as a redistributive tool
25

The current deduction for extraordinary medical expenses and the deduction for large casualty losses can
be understood as just this sort of adjustment of unusually large consumption needs. The difference with the
genetic health index would, in theory, be that the adjustment would be based on an individual’s innate
(genetic) propensity to contract certain diseases, thus eliminating any distortionary (moral hazard) effects
that might accompany the current approach. The gene-based argument should not be thought of as a
replacement for the realization-based deduction, though, unless the genetic test can predict outcomes
without error.
Louis Kaplow has suggested to us the comparison to Social Security Disability Insurance, a
payroll-tax-funded program that provides income to people unable to work because of a disability until
their condition improves, and which offers income payments if their condition does not improve. A person
qualifies if, among other conditions, they have a physical or mental condition that prevents them from
engaging in any "substantial gainful work", and the condition is expected to last at least 12 months or result
in death. Although medical proof is needed to show their inability to work, eligibility is subject to
manipulation by applicants. In this case, use of genetic information can improve the accuracy of the
disability determination and thereby more effectively target the payments, with less manipulation.
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for any given set of genetic differences, it only makes sense to reduce those differences to
a single metric for the purpose of calculating the redistributive transfer.
B. Implementation Issues
For such an endowment tax-and-transfer regime to work, policymakers would
obviously need to overcome numerous, possibly insurmountable, conceptual and
technological difficulties. Some genes may have both welfare-enhancing and welfarereducing attributes. For example, a gene may reduce one’s risk of cancer but increase
one’s risk of some other illness. Such effects would have to be netted out. Similarly, if
an individual had a genetic marker for several expensive but nonfatal diseases, but also
had a gene for longevity, that grim combination would also need to be taken into
account. 26 It is also likely that many of the various genes that correlate with traits that we
regard as distributively significant, and hence the endowment tax indices and sub-indices
based on those genes, are also correlated with each other. Thus, for example, the gene
that correlates positively with “good judgment,” if there were such a gene, might also be
the gene that correlates with “low risk of lung cancer.” Or maybe not. But this sort of
interactive effect would have to be worked out.
As it turns out, there is in fact a strong positive correlation between health status
and earnings, and thus probably also with earnings potential. 27 This fact implies that an
endowment tax that was based on the potential health index alone would also
automatically capture some of the differences in earning potential as well. Put
differently, an individual’s genetic health status by itself might well be a useful tag. The
correlation between health and income, however, is neither perfect nor universal. Some
people with good health genes will have low earning power, and some with bad health
genes will be high earners. 28 Whether the benefits of fine-tuning the tags to adjust for
these possibilities would exceed the costs of doing so is an open question.
Even if an index of the sort we are imagining were created, presumably science
would continue to develop over time, and more information would emerge on the
connections between various genes and potential earnings or potential health. Also, the
“tractability” of the factors could change. There could also be changes in the relative
market value of various abilities, or the costs of various illnesses. Thus, as mentioned
above, having the good-at-math gene might be extremely valuable during one historical
period, and then much less valuable in another. As a result, periodic adjustments to
26

The possibility of a longevity gene creates special complications. For example, imagine that, if an
individual has this gene, her life expectancy is 5 years longer than the average. Now, if we are
implementing a genetic endowment tax that is based on ability to earn as well as healthcare expenditures,
should this person pay an extra tax (because she will be around longer to make more money) or receive a
transfer (since she will be around longer and have greater consumption needs)?
27
See, for example, Smith (1999).
28
If, counterfactually, the correlation were to go the other way (if high earners tended to be less healthy),
the two indices would have to be netted against each other in some way, and the use of the health tag alone
might be problematic. One could even imagine a situation in which the optimal transfer would be from the
(on average rich) sick to the (on average poor) healthy, or in the opposite direction, depending on the
relative magnitude of the two indices.
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individuals’ endowment indices and sub-indices would have to be made by the taxing
authority if the accuracy of the indices were to be kept up to date. In theory, this could be
handled in year-to-year adjustments to an individual’s tax liability, as the overall index is
recalculated for each individual based on the most current science available. Of course,
some level of inaccuracy in the indices would be acceptable, a fact which suggests that
constant updating may not be required. The fact, however, that the genetic endowment
index, and thus the endowment tax, could change from year to year could be seen as a
grounds for criticizing the endowment tax idea, and for preferring an income or
consumption tax, which do not require continual modifications based on scientific
progress. 29
It is important here to emphasize that these genetic indices would, at best, reflect
estimates of potential future earnings and future health. That is just how genes work.
Although there are some diseases that seem to be wholly caused by a person’s genes
(Huntington’s disease being the most famous example), most of the information that
genes provide about health (and presumably about future earnings as well) would be
estimates of probabilities; and the actual future health or earnings of an individual will
depend on a combination of genetic predisposition and factors that bear on how the genes
are “expressed,” which can include choices that the individual makes as well as pure
brute luck. Thus, just as having the lung-cancer gene (if one exists) would probably only
mean that a person has a higher than average chance of getting lung cancer, having the
good-at-math gene would only mean that a person has a higher than average chance of
turning out to be a math whiz.
C. The Market Response to the Spread of Genetic Information and the Potential
Government Counter Responses
Whether or not tax-and-transfer policy reacts to the availability of genetic
information, private markets almost certainly will, unless the government steps in to
prevent it. In this section we discuss some of the possible market responses, the benefits
and costs of regulation of private use of this information, and whether these market
responses suggest a reassessment of a gene-based tax-and-transfer system.
Imagine that the scientific advances in identifying genes that determine or
influence potential earnings and potential health status described above become a reality
and that such information becomes available to private parties, not merely to the
individuals themselves (who might or might not want to know what their genetic future
holds) but also to potential employers and insurers. We can imagine both employers and
insurers putting this information to use. For example, potential employers would have an
incentive to use the various genetic predictors of ability (such as those correlated with
aptitude in math and abstract reasoning, good judgment, perseverance, amiable
personality, and so on) to help them select the right people for the right jobs. Likewise, if
there are industrial jobs that are best performed by people with special resistance to
certain toxins, or jobs best held by people with specialized aptitudes, genetic testing may
29

Although the optimal income tax would change as new evidence became available about the elasticity of
taxable income at various income levels or on the distribution of earning ability.
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facilitate such efficient, social-welfare-enhancing job sorting. Indeed, with personality
and aptitude tests that some employers already use, this type of job-sorting already
occurs, though perhaps with less accuracy than would be the case if the genetic markers
could also be used.
Genetically-informed job sorting thus could well increase overall social welfare.
Not all private uses of genetic information, however, would necessarily be considered
benign. Employers and insurers might also want to use some genetic markers in ways
that society regards as illegitimate reasons for distinguishing among people in
employment decisions, and the law could prohibit the use of those markers—just as the
law already prohibits the use of such criteria as race, gender, and age in employment
decisions. 30 In addition, employers, and especially health insurers, would be very
interested in an individual’s potential health status, although not every employer and
insurer would necessarily be equally interested in the same combination of health-related
genes. For example, insurers who offer standard health insurance coverage would want
to know an individual’s genetic predisposition to various diseases that produce significant
lifetime medical expenses. Indeed, such information would allow them to charge
extremely “accurate” (in terms of actuarial accuracy) premiums to very narrowly-drawn
risk pools. Of course, for those individuals with a very strong genetic predisposition to
the most expensive diseases, health insurance may well become cost-prohibitive. In
addition, insofar as employers provide health insurance to their employees, or they serve
as the underwriters of self-insured health benefit plans for their employees, as is often
currently the case, the two effects would exacerbate each other: employers would be
inclined not to insure, or hire at all, those with genetically predicted poor health. 31
The market process just described, at least when it occurs in the insurance
context, is often referred to as risk segregation or risk classification. It is an almost
inevitable result of competition among employers and insurers. And it is normally
considered to be efficiency enhancing. Accurate risk segregation, for example, helps
insurance markets to function by allowing insurers to combat the problem of adverse
selection due to asymmetric information, the tendency of relatively high-risk individuals
to select into insurance pools, driving up the average cost of the pool and pricing some
people out of the market. Obviously, the problem of adverse selection could become
much worse in a world in which individuals themselves have access to their own genetic
health profiles, but insurers do not. Thus, if individuals who might have a genetic
predisposition to certain debilitating and expensive diseases had access to that
information and insurance companies did not, health and disability insurance markets
might not be sustainable (depending on how many individuals had those genes.) Genetic
risk segregation can prevent this sort of collapse of insurance pools due to genetically
30

For example, some may object to the use of a genetic test for potential aptitude in place of an actual
aptitude test. However, presumably an employer would use the combination of genetic and actual aptitude
tests that would produce the most accurate overall prediction of likely job performance.
31
Life insurance markets would also be affected. Life insurance companies would use the health-status
sub-indices relating to longevity to determine how much to charge for life insurance premiums, and
individuals with genetic markers for high risk of cancer and heart disease would either be forced to pay
very high life insurance premiums or go uninsured.
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motivated adverse selection. More generally, fine-tuned risk segregation in insurance
markets facilitates the pricing of insurance according to individual risk characteristics.
To the extent, however, that differences in health risks are genetically determined
(and thus are outside of the control of the individual), there is an obvious tension between
the notion that individuals should pay insurance premiums that are actuarially fair (that
reflect their expected costs to the insurance company) and society’s concern with
distributive justice, discussed above. That is, we mentioned above the fact that
lawmakers might decide to increase social welfare through transfers from those with
better genetic health prospects to those with worse genetic health prospects, just as
lawmakers might decide to make transfers from high potential earners to low potential
earners. The point of both sorts of transfers is to equalize the social marginal utility of
income across individuals, and thereby maximize overall utility or welfare. When
insurance companies can charge premiums that reflect genetically-determined risks,
however, it cuts in exactly the opposite direction. Rather than transferring from the better
off to the less well off, genetically “accurate” insurance premiums reproduce the status
quo: those with better genes pay less, while those with worse genes pay more. Again,
this is the result of competition among insurers.
Given this world of insurers competing to price their policies to maximize profits
and of employers seeking to place employees in the jobs that maximize the employers’
profits, and assuming for now that society (again, on welfarist or utilitarian grounds)
wishes to reduce some of the inequality between the genetically rich and genetically poor,
there are at least two obvious policy responses to the spread of genetic information. First,
we could allow genetic risk segregation and job sorting to take place and then redistribute
through a direct tax-and-transfer policy, as outlined in the previous section, perhaps
through a tagging system added to an existing income tax regime; this would achieve the
efficiency gains in insurance and labor markets without any unwanted distributional
consequences. Alternatively, we could forgo the tagging approach and instead adopt
insurance and employments laws forbidding genetic discrimination – that is, forbidding
the use of genetic information in employment and insurance contexts.
At first blush, forbidding the use of genetic information by insurers would seem to
have much the same effect as allowing them to use the genetic information but then
enacting a redistributive tax-and-transfer system to undo the effect of the insurance
discrimination. What’s more, the anti-discrimination approach has the benefit of
automatically calculating the welfare equalizing amount of transfer that occurs within the
insurance pool; that is, the transfer (or cross-subsidization) from low-risk to high-risk
individuals will exactly offset the genetically determined difference in pre-insurance
well-being. 32 This type of indirect transfer regime, however, has some problems. First,
there may be some fairness concerns with redistributing only from the genetically lucky
to the genetically unlucky within an insurance pool that does not include everyone in
society. That is, if the tax-and-transfer system were used to equalize between the
genetically healthy and genetically unhealthy, the redistribution could be from everyone
in society with the good genes to everyone in society with the bad genes. In general,
32

This conclusion assumes that the insurance fully covers the risk being insured.
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spreading the redistribution over a larger base reduces the overall welfare cost of the
redistributive regime. By contrast, if the regulatory approach is used – causing indirect
transfers within insurance pools due to the rule against genetic discrimination –
redistribution is more haphazard; it will be more effective for people in large pools than
for those in small pools. Second, if insurers are forbidden to use genetic information but
insurance applicants can use it, the potential for adverse selection is obvious. Third, if
insurers cannot use genetic information, moral hazard problems arise as well. For
example, if there were a gene that revealed only a predisposition to a certain disease (say,
heart disease or cancer), insurers might be able to use that information to encourage those
who are insured to take special steps to reduce their risks, such as through diet or
exercise. Forbidding the use of that information could actually impede appropriate
medical treatment in that case.
All of these factors suggest that, if the government is going to adopt a
redistributive response to the spread of genetic information, the best approach might be to
allow insurers and employers to use genetic information, but then adopt an explicit
genetic endowment tax regime (via tagging) that reduces the inequality between the
genetic haves and have-nots. 33 Interestingly, the law in the U.S. seems to have gone the
other way. As we have already noted, there is no explicit genetic endowment tax-andtransfer regime currently in the U.S., while most state governments in the U.S. have
adopted rules forbidding insurers from using genetic testing in their underwriting
procedures, and some have done the same with employment practices. 34 What is
interesting for present purposes is the following observation: insofar as we have laws
forbidding the use of genetic information, there is a sense in which we already have a
form of genetic endowment tax, though an imperfect one (and perhaps not even the best
one we could have).
This fact should, in our view, lead to a reframing of the debate over the
endowment tax idea. That is, given the reality of the marketplace, and given the state
anti-discrimination laws that have been adopted in response to the spread of genetic
information, we already have a form of endowment tax regime, one that is administered
indirectly through employment and insurance markets. Thus, for those who object to the
“forced labor” or “wage slavery” associated with a direct endowment tax, they should
also be concerned with the forced-labor effect of an indirect endowment tax. Thus, when
an insurer, due to a state law against genetic discrimination, is forced to charge a
genetically healthy individual a higher premium than she would have been charged if the
insurer had been allowed to charge lower, actuarially fair (and genetically discriminatory)
premiums, there would be a sort of “income effect.” The lucky healthy individual with
the healthy genes would have to work harder or longer hours at her job, or might even
have to switch to a higher paying job, to achieve the same level of consumption that she
33

Note, however that there is less of a case for using an anti-discrimination principle instead of a genetic
endowment tax if (a) there is universal compulsory health insurance (eliminating the adverse selection
problem and the concern about unfairly burdening a small pool of contributors) and (b) the antidiscrimination principle is applied only to diseases or conditions that are fully genetically determined (such
as Huntington’s disease) where there is no, or relatively little, moral hazard concern. See Logue and
Avraham (2003).
34
See sources cited above in footnote 12, and also Rothstein (2001).
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would under an actuarially fair insurance regime. As with the direct endowment tax,
there would be no distortion in her choices, no substitution effect, as the “tax” (that is, the
difference between her actual insurance premium and the actuarially fair insurance
premium) is lump sum based on the individual’s genes. But there could certainly be an
income effect, of the sort that has raised concerns among endowment tax critics.
Thus, at this point, the relevant question is not whether to adopt an endowment
tax regime, but whether to alter the one we have (by making genetic discrimination fully
legal in all contexts). What the next section points out is that, even if policymakers chose
to alter the existing indirect genetic endowment regime (that is, to repeal all of the laws
forbidding the use of genetic information in insurance and employment markets), the
market may yet respond again – this time with its own form of an endowment tax-andtransfer system, which we call endowment insurance.

D. Genetic Endowment Insurance
Let us for now assume that policymakers do decide to repeal the existing implicit
genetic endowment transfer regime (by repealing laws against genetic discrimination)
and decide also not to pursue an explicit genetic endowment tagging regime of the sort
described in section A above. What this means is that employers and insurers are
allowed to require genetic testing of their applicants, and are allowed to use the
information as they see fit. Assume also, of course, that individuals can have themselves
tested and learn their own genetic makeup. One significant result of this set of
assumptions has significant consequences is that, at the moment an individual is born—
indeed earlier, at the moment of conception (or the moment when sperm and egg
combine to create a new set of chromosomes with its own complement of genetic
material and that material can be analyzed without harm to the fetus) or upon genetic
testing of the parents—much can be learned about that individual’s future prospects.
Indeed, assuming technological advances have given us the genetic endowment indices
described above, we can know whether the individual is, overall, in terms of her inherited
genetic endowment, rich, poor, or average.
In the absence of a genetic endowment tax regime, what might we expect to
happen? One possibility is the rise of a private market in genetic endowment insurance. 35
One way to see this point is from the perspective of a risk-averse couple that is thinking
about having a child. They know their own genetic endowments and thus have the ability
35

Another possible repercussion is the rise of genetic engineering or eugenics, the incentive for which will
depend on the genetic regulatory and tax-and-transfer policies in place, and any behavioral response to
which belies our labeling such policies as having no effect on behavior other than an income effect. It is
also possible, of course, that in some future world, technology may enable prospective parents to choose
the DNA of their children, or at least to have some level of control or choice in the matter. To the extent
that were to happen, genetic markers, even if statistically correlated with well being, would no longer be
ideal tax tags, as they would no longer be immutable from an ex ante perspective. A discussion of the
ramifications of this, and other related issues such as selective abortion, for our arguments is best left for
another time, beyond noting that using a genetic tag in the tax-and-transfer system will reduce the incentive
to undertake these gene-improving activities and on average reduces the long-term average genetic
endowment in the same way that an income tax affects income-producing activities.

18
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007

19

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 78 [2007]

to estimate the probability distribution of possible genetic endowments for their child.
But they can’t be sure of exactly what genetic draw their child will receive. Putting aside
for now the prospect of genetic engineering, there is some irreducible degree of
uncertainty as to what their child’s mix of genetic material will be. This concerns the
prospective parents both because they care about the child and want him or her to have a
good life, at least not to have to bear the burden of an low genetic endowment, and
because they know that their own prospects are tied to those of the child, since the child’s
consumption and medical needs will be their responsibility (at least for 18 years or so)
and since they may be hoping the child will become rich and support them in their old
age. So this genetic score means a lot to them.
Enter the genetic endowment insurer, which offers to sell the couple a policy that
covers the family against the risk that the child will end up with a below average genetic
endowment. The policy is written and sold before conception, with a premium based
presumably on the parent’s own genetic endowment indices. After conception, when the
fetus’s genes can be tested, the test is given, and the policy either pays off or it doesn’t.
If the child is found to have a low genetic endowment, the family receives a lump-sum
payment, which the parents can then invest in a deferred annuity on behalf of the kid, the
proceeds of which can be used to fund the extra medical expenses or to make up for loss
of lifetime earnings due to the child’s genetic endowment. Thus, a transfer is made to the
families of the genetically unlucky children and, in a sense (because only the unlucky
ones receive the insurance payout though all pay into the pool), a tax is imposed on the
families of the genetically lucky children. Of course, if policymakers are concerned that
the parents of the genetically lucky children will squander the insurance money, they
could adopt a rule requiring that the insurance proceeds be invested and spent a certain
way, but this idea again takes us down the road of government intervention. The more
government involvement there is, the more restriction on how the money is spent and
perhaps on the amount of premiums that can be collected, the more a world of privately
provided genetic endowment insurance begins to look like a regime of direct genetic
endowment taxation of the sort described above, but administered through private
insurers as tax collectors. 36
The idea of genetic endowment insurance may seem farfetched, but it is less
outlandish than one might think. Whenever a parent purchases life insurance on their
young child, they are effectively purchasing genetic endowment insurance of sorts. That
is, they are effectively purchasing insurance against the possibility that the child will
someday reveal a genetic predisposition to an illness that will make him uninsurable.

36

This discussion highlights one interesting aspect of the rise of genetic endowment indices that we have
not yet discussed, and that is absent from the literatures on endowment taxation and genetic discrimination:
each time there is a new discovery linking a particular gene to a particular disease, that discovery has the
qualities of a one time lump-sum wealth tax on all individuals who have that gene, whether born or unborn.
That is, if you are alive at the time the discovery is made, then, in the absence of a system of redistribution
or cross subsidization, you are essentially subject to a lump-sum tax equal to the present value of the
lifetime expected costs of having that gene. (And if you have any plans to produce children, the tax must
be multiplied by some inheritance factor.) This conclusion, however, assumes the absence of a market in
genetic endowment insurance.
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This is explicitly how the insurance is marketed. 37 It is only a few steps from this
relatively common form of insurance to a broader market for insurance against bad health
or ability genes. What is interesting about the idea for present purposes is that such
genetic endowment insurance would, if feasible, constitute a privately-provided, wholly
voluntary system of endowment taxation and transfer.
To the extent the government gets involved in the problem of genetic inequality—
and either adopts a regulatory genetic endowment tax (through antidiscrimination rules)
or some more direct form of genetic endowment adjustments to the income tax—the
demand for, and thus the market for, genetic endowment insurance would disappear.
What this observation suggests is that privately provided genetic endowment or a system
of government provided genetic endowment taxes and transfers are substitutes for each
other. This should come as no surprise. It has often been observed that the existing taxand-transfer regimes are akin to insurance for the as-yet unborn against the possibility
that they will be born with a low endowment. 38
Note that both government-provided and privately provided genetic endowment
insurance covers only the risk of an unfavorable genetic draw, and does not provide
insurance against other types of risk. For example, even if there were a genetic
endowment tax-and-transfer regime, or alternatively if there were a private market in
genetic endowment insurance, neither form of protection would address the risk that the
economy might change over time to render an individual’s initial endowment less
valuable, or the risk that the individual might come down with some debilitating disease,
whatever her genetic predisposition for such a disease might be. To put the point
differently, how an individual’s life turns out, in terms of overall well-being (including
income, health, etc.), is a function both of her initial genetic endowment and post-birth
brute luck; genetic endowment insurance – whether government- or privately provided –
does not address the latter. 39 Of course, other types of government transfer programs, as
well as other types of private insurance policies, might serve as insurance against these
other sorts of risk. For example, the progressive income tax and privately purchased
insurance contracts provide coverage against the possibility of extreme ex post
outcomes. Such conventional forms of insurance, however, raise all of the familiar moral
hazard problems associated with standard forms of insurance; further discussion of such
insurance is beyond the scope of this particular essay.

37

For example, see www.afadvantage, where the pitch for such insurance is “No matter what health
problems may develop in years to come, the policy cannot be cancelled.”
38
Sinn (2003) makes such an argument, stressing the possibility that cross-country mobility of individuals
and capital will erode the ability of countries to provide such insurance. Compare the classic argument of
Harsanyi (1955), who develops an approach to optimal progressivity based on risk-averse individuals
choosing the tax-and-transfer system in an “orignal position” where no individual has any information
about what ability they will draw from a known distribution.
39
Dan Shaviro helped us to see this point. For a more general discussion of the tension within welfarist
policy analysis between ex ante and ex post perspectives in circumstances in which there is a societal
preference for reducing inequality, see Adler and Sanchirico (2006).
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IV. Conclusion
Advances in genetic research promise to loosen the tradeoff between progressivity
and efficiency by allowing tax liability (or transfer eligibility) to be based in part on
immutable characteristics of individuals (“tags”) that are correlated with their expected
lot in life. Use of genetic tags would reduce reliance on tax bases (such as income) that
are subject to individual choices and therefore subject to inefficient distortion to those
choices. Taking advantage of this information will allow policy outcomes that dominate
the outcome menu available without using genes as tags—everyone can be made better
off. The same distributional outcome can be attained with less cost to the economy.
Thus, our first contribution to the endowment tax literature is the observation that
the spread of genetic information bears on the optimal tax design, to the extent that genes
are observable and nearly immutable tags for overall well-being. Our second
contribution is to point out that, as genetic information spreads to private employers and
insurers (and assuming the law did not effectively prevent them from using such
information), the case for adopting some kind of a genetic endowment tax becomes more
compelling, as genetic inequalities would be exacerbated by market forces. If society
desires to reduce or eliminate such inequalities, to maximize overall utility by shifting
resources from the genetic rich to the genetic poor, at least two potential policy
instruments are available: a direct genetic endowment tax-and-transfer regime, or a
regulatory regime that forbids genetic discrimination and forces genetic crosssubsidization.
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